AB STRACT
The prospect of scaling up aid inflows to address the challenges of the HIV/AIDS pandem ic is looked on with som e trepidation by m any policy m akers who dread potential Dutch disease effects. This paper argues that, given the effect of the epidem ic on labor and hum an capital and the potential productivity gains from restoring hum an developm ent, proper m anagem ent of aid flows can preclude the nightm are scenarios that have been contem plated in the literature. In fact, if aid is frontloaded in order to expand capacity by building necessary infrastructure, institutions and hum an capital, welfare and productivity benefits will be m axim ized. The m acroeconom ic 'disturbances', such as inflation and appreciation of the exchange rate, which are concom itant with increased aid absorption are usually necessary for the appropriate adjustm ent of the econom y and should be neither feared nor countered in the short run. Correction and m itigation is called for only if these m acroeconom ic disturbances escalate or persist. However, there is som e justification for recipient countries to build up a m odest reserve cover in the early stages of the scale up (of aid receipts) in order to allow for subsequent m itigation of any volatility of aid flows.
FO REW O RD
This Conference Paper on "Managing the Exchange-Rate Consequences of an MDG-Related Scale-up in HIV/AIDS Financing" was com m issioned for the Global Conference on "Gearing Macroeconom ic Policies to Reverse the HIV/AIDS Financing", which was held in Brasilia, [20] [21] Novem ber 2006. It is the first in a four-part series that contributes to the on-going debate on m acroeconom ic policies in low-incom e countries that restrict the scaling up of financial resources for an expanded HIV/AIDS response.
The conference was jointly sponsored by the HIV/AIDS Group of the U nited Nations Developm ent Program m e, New York and the International Poverty Centre, Brasilia. It brought together representatives from governm ent and civil society, the IMF, HIV/AIDS specialists and econom ists in a lively and productive dialogue on the policy and practical governance requirem ents for m acroeconom ic stability in HIV-affected countries.
The publication of three additional papers on m onetary policies, fiscal policies, and a country case study of Kenya will follow suit. We hope that these Conference Papers will m ake a valuable contribution to the ongoing dialogue and debate on this critical issue, and help m otivate further studies at the country level. 
INTRO D U CTIO N
The projected increases in aid for HIV/AIDS-related initiatives, com bined with aid directed at achieving other Millennium Developm ent Goals (MDGs), is likely to m ean a rapid scale up in developm ent assistance for m any countries currently experiencing high HIV/AIDS infection rates. The prospect of this potentially rapid scale up elicits a sense of trepidation in m any of these countries because it portends the possibility of m acroeconom ic instability and/or Dutch disease effects that m ay underm ine growth.
The concern about m acroeconom ic instability derives largely from the im plicit and explicit conditionality contained in country Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and related Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGFs). Based on the presum ption that a stable m acroeconom ic environm ent is critical for growth, these countries are directed to m aintain single digit inflation levels, low budget deficits and balance of paym ents equilibrium . There are inherent contradictions, as well as significant policy challenges, in strict adherence to these prescriptions in the face of large aid inflows.
The theoretical literature on Dutch disease argues that, in the sam e way that a natural resource windfall can lead to an appreciated exchange rate, which leads, in turn, to the dem ise of the export producing sector (other than the natural-resource-producing sector itself) in that country, high and sustained aid inflows have m uch the sam e effect. Though the em pirical literature provides little support for the presence of that relationship, developing countries do fear that high inflows of aid m ay indeed prove to be a "curse" by contributing to the im m iserization of their export sectors.
The true potential curse of large aid flows m ay not be Dutch disease but aid volatility. In the absence of attem pts to m anage volatility by donor agencies, countries m ay have to address this challenge by explicitly creating a reserve buffer that allows for som e decoupling of the tim ing of disbursem ents and the tim ing of dom estic spending of such disbursem ents.
It will be argued here that, with a scaling up of aid, while som e real exchange rate appreciation m ay be inevitable (and even necessary) in the short run, the nature of these econom ies, the likely productivity enhancing effect of HIV/AIDS interventions and the balance of the em pirical evidence suggest that any initial real exchange rate appreciation will be reversed in relatively short order. However, an inflexible approach to m acroeconom ic stability that does not allow for significant short-run deviations from inflation targets and interprets aid-related current account and fiscal deficits as signals of disequilibrium will underm ine the short-, m edium -and long-run effectiveness of aid flows.
To that end, Section II presents the justification for increasing aid inflows to countries challenged by the HIV/AIDS epidem ic and Section III exam ines the resource im plications. The fears related to large aid inflows and the m acroeconom ic policy context in which such flows are likely to take place are discussed in Sections IV and V respectively. Section VI outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the dom inant concern with respect to large aid inflows -Dutch disease -then exam ines potential m odifications to the theory, the em pirical evidence and the (m acroeconom ic) m anagem ent experience relating to large aid inflows. Section VII presents a proposed fram ework for the optim al m anagem ent of aid flows. The concluding section sum m arizes the discussion.
TH E JU STIFICATIO N FO R H IV /AID S-RELATED INFLO W S
Despite what m ay seem like a distant target date (of 2015) , it can be reasonably argued that yearly progress towards the achievem ent of all of the Millennium Developm ent Goals (MDGs) is, and should be, an ever pressing concern. In the particular case of the first part of goal num ber six -to halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS -the U nited Nations General Assem bly Special Session of 2001 articulated the need for im m ediate action and the achievem ent of specified short-run targets (U nited Nations, 2001) . That particular sense of urgency is justified by three im portant attributes of the disease:
i. HIV/AIDS is still an expanding global pandem ic; and ii. If left unm itigated, the ravages of the disease will threaten hum an developm ent in general, and the achievem ent of several Millennium Developm ent Goals in particular, over both the short and long term .
iii. The HIV/AIDS pandem ic also threatens econom ic growth.
The U nited Nations estim ates that there were 4.1 m illion new HIV infections in 2005 and 2.8 AIDS-related deaths, resulting in a net increase of 1.3 m illion people living with the disease (U nited Nations, 2005a). Ten countries are estim ated to have HIV/AIDS infection rates of m ore than 10 percent in the 15-49 age group, seventeen have infection rates of greater than five percent, and 56 countries have infection rates higher than one percent (World Developm ent Indicators, 2006) . More worrisom e, between 2003 and 2005, the infection rate in 82 countries showed an upward trajectory, while only 36 countries recorded a downward trajectory in infection rates.
As a disease with potentially high m ortality rates, HIV/AIDS has already seriously com prom ised hum an developm ent outcom es for countries with high rates of infection. As Figure 1 indicates, countries with the highest rate of infection (greater than ten percent of the 15-49 age group) have experienced an average loss of fifteen years of life expectancy since 1987, and approxim ately twenty years com pared to the levels that would have been attained had past trends continued. Even countries with m edium rates of infection (between one and five percent) have seen com prom ised hum an developm ent outcom es (relating to life expectancy). Though average life expectancy has not fallen, its rate of growth has flattened out considerably in these countries since 1987 (especially when com pared to countries with low infection rates). If pre-1987 patterns had continued, these countries would have achieved life expectancy levels approxim ately four years higher than was actually achieved in 2004.
HIV/AIDS and poverty are closely interlinked in a dual causality m atrix. The poor are m ore vulnerable to HIV/AIDS in the sam e way that they are m ore vulnerable to m ost infectious diseases. This is because several factors that increase vulnerability (such as poor nutrition, poor education, poor health status and lim ited access to health services) are also coincident with poverty (U NDP 2003) . But HIV/AIDS itself is likely to generate poverty and further entrench existing poverty. If untreated, the disease invariably leads to prem ature m ortality, preceded by an average of eighteen m onths of severe m orbidity during which high m edical costs are typically incurred (Parker, 2003) . The loss of household incom e due to m orbidity and death, the cost of treatm ent (even when full-blown AIDS is avoided), and the withdrawal of caregivers from the labor force can drive a form erly non-poor household below the poverty line. Booysen (2004) showed that, for a sam ple of South African households, HIV/AIDS was not only m ore likely to affect poor households, but also non-poor households affected by the disease dem onstrated a greater likelihood of downward econom ic m obility while poor households affected by the disease showed reduced upward m obility.
FIGU RE 1

H IV Infections Rates and Life Expectancy
Source: World Developm ent Indicators (Online Version) 2006 (The World Bank). The poverty m easures are the lowest recorded for each of the ten-year periods and the average (poverty headcount ratio) for m ost groups is for the subset of countries for which data were available.
The challenge of halving extrem e poverty by 2015 is therefore m ade m ore daunting where infection rates are significant. In fact, countries with high or m edium infection rates experienced increased poverty in recent years. Table 1 indicates that, from the 1985-94 period to the 1995-04 period, the (unweighted) average poverty headcount ratios for countries with HIV/AIDS infection rates of one percent or greater increased. That ratio was falling only for countries with infection rates below one percent. Though this evidence does not suffice as proof that HIV/AIDS is the cause of increased poverty, that likelihood is bolstered by the fact that this result cannot be attributed to the generally poor perform ance of sub-Saharan Africa (where all the very high prevalence countries are located). For the periods under consideration, the (unweighted) average poverty rate in sub-Saharan Africa did not rise but, instead, fell slightly.
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Lowering child m ortality by two-thirds is another Millennium Developm ent Goal that this pandem ic m akes m ore challenging. The disease increases the risk to children through several avenues. Without m edical intervention, m other-to-child transm ission is likely. Orphaned children or children of sick parents are also less likely to m ake it to their fifth birthday. The stresses of having a person living with HIV/AIDS in a fam ily, even when m others are healthy, can also reduce the care that children receive (U NDP, 2003) . The effect of that am plified challenge is already obvious in current outcom es. As Figure 2 shows, for countries with high HIV/AIDS infection rates, the previously steep downward path of child m ortality rates have essentially com e to a halt since 1990. By com parison, countries with low prevalence rates (and, to a lesser extent, countries with m edium rates) have continued to lower child m ortality rates into the 21 st century. There is, as yet, little evidence, at the m acro level, that HIV/AIDS is com prom ising broad education achievem ents in high and m edium -prevalence countries (Table 2) , but there are m any reasons to believe that the disease hinders progress at the m icro level and will thus m ake further progress difficult over the long-term . Fam ilies coping with the disease are m ore likely to rem ove children from school because of their inability to m eet education costs. Education m ay also be com prom ised by the need for additional incom e (from child labor) or the need for older children to becom e caregivers (to sick parents) or the loss of household heads when parents are deceased (U NDP, 2004) . Additionally, the loss of hum an capital (teachers and adm inistrators) has a qualitative effect on the education provided, which will not show up in enrolm ent data but is likely to have an effect on future productivity.
Because the disease strikes at workers in their m ost productive years, the productive capacity of the econom y is likely to be com prom ised across all sectors. The presence of large num bers of unem ployed and underem ployed in the econom y m eans that the im m ediate labor constraint that the exceptionally high death rates (am ong the active adult population) could have im plied m ay be delayed. This is suggested by the figures in Table 3 , which show that despite the fact that high and very high prevalence countries have been dealing with high death rates am ong the active adult population for at least twenty years, they were able to keep pace with low and m oderate prevalence countries (in term s of growth) until the turn of the century. Since then, however, they appear to be falling behind in term s of average growth. Given the typically large num bers of unem ployed and underem ployed in these econom ies, it is understandable that it would take som e tim e for these countries to com e up against labor resource constraints. However, skilled labor is not plentiful in these countries and the persistent loss of skilled labor would (in all likelihood) have eventually overwhelm ed replacem ent capacity. The productivity of both existing skilled and unskilled labor is also likely to have been increasingly com prom ised by the high m orbidity rates resulting from increasing num bers of full blown AIDS cases. Moreover, the presence of unem ploym ent and underem ploym ent does not necessarily im ply that lost labor can be replaced in short order. Som e labor is specific to certain factors of production (notably land) in a way that reduces m obility. For exam ple, farm ers and self-em ployed persons m ay not be easily replaceable if they becom e ill or die. The business m ay not be transferred and, even if transferred, m ay witness significant productivity losses. For this group, the effect of m orbidity as well as the loss of labor because of the need for care-giving are particularly exaggerated.
Not only is this likely to have an effect on overall output growth; in the area of food production it can also have a direct effect on hum an developm ent outcom es. In econom ies where food production for hom e consum ption is critical to m eeting m inim um dietary needs, reduced food production can m ean lower nutrition outcom es generally, and for children in particular. Poor nutrition outcom es, besides the direct im plication of increased hunger, can have negative repercussions for other hum an developm ent outcom es in the areas of health and education. The trajectory of growth in food production still rem ains positive for countries with high and very high infection rates, as Figure 3 indicates, but this trajectory is dem onstrably flatter than it is for countries with lower infection rates. Given their growing populations, these countries m ay be close to or already experiencing falling per capita food production levels. The effects described above are likely to be extended and deepened over tim e as social capital (in the form of relations of trust, such as within the fam ily, com m unity level institutions and social networks), which is needed to m itigate the effects of the pandem ic, is itself underm ined by the disease. In addition to the effects of m orbidity, death and the loss of livelihood, the stress, fear and distrust related to high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates lead to the breakdown of fam ily units (Drinkwater, 2005) . Beyond any im m ediate effects, the intergenerational transfer of skills and knowledge is interrupted (Misselhorn, 2005) . Com m unity institutions and networks, in turn, are underm ined by the disintegration of sexual and social norm s, the increased m obility of individuals and fam ilies, and the forced changes in the econom ic and social roles of individuals (Bryceson and Fonseca,2006; Drinkwater 2003 Drinkwater , 2005 Misselhorn, 2005) .
Besides its effects on hum an developm ent in general (and MDGs in particular) through the various channels discussed above, HIV/AIDS is likely to further com prom ise the potential for hum an developm ent advancem ent by slowing down econom ic growth. The effect on growth can occur through various m echanism s. The m orbidity and m edical costs related to HIV/AIDS are likely to reduce both household and business savings (Q uattek, 2000) . Lower productivity from the loss of hum an capital will lower output. It will also do so indirectly by discouraging foreign (as well as dom estic private) investm ent, even as public investm ent is constrained by the need for increased health sector spending (Anand et al, 1999; Haacker, 2002) . These effects m ay be further com pounded, and exacerbated over tim e, by lower growth in hum an capital (as the high m ortality rates reduce school attendance and teacher availability) and lower hum an capital investm ent (due to the disincentive effect of m ortality on individuals and firm s) (Arndt, 2006; Arndt and Lewis, 2000) .
In addition, the breakdown of econom ic and social institutions m ay underm ine productivity capacity (Misselhorn, 2005; Bryceson and Fonseca, 2006) . For high-prevalence countries, the im pact is estim ated to be substantial. For exam ple, Arndt (2006) In m uch of the discussion regarding appropriate strategies for achieving the MDGs, growth is seen as a critical interm ediary. 5 Yet, as the previous discussion m akes clear, HIV/AIDS threatens hum an developm ents not only directly but also indirectly through the growth process. It threatens growth not only by reducing productivity and productive capacity and underm ining the process of capital accum ulation and technology transfer, but also through its effects on hum an developm ent itself. The effects of HIV/AIDS on health, nutrition and hum an and social capital accum ulation -attributes of hum an developm ent -all have potential growth im plications. Clearly, as suggested by Sen (1999) and dem onstrated by Ranis, Stewart and Ram irez (2000) , and Boozer et al (2003) , there is bi-directional causation here, and HIV/AIDS threatens to intervene in that process in a way that leads from a virtuous cycle to a vicious one. Indeed, there is som e evidence that this deterioration m ay already be im m inent in several high prevalence countries. Table 3 suggests that while high prevalence countries were able to m aintain com parable rates of econom ic growth with other countries until 1999, since then, their average rate of growth has fallen behind those of countries with lower rates of infection. 
O FFIC IAL D EV ELO PMENT ASSISTANCE (O D A) AND H IV /AID S
In line with the global nature of the epidem ic and its prom inence as part of a Millennium Developm ent Goal (MDG), there has been a global dim ension to the actions taken to halt the spread and address the costs of HIV/AIDS. That includes the funding for research on possible vaccines and the superstructure of international institutions involved in m onitoring, advocacy and resource m obilization. However, action at the local level in the areas of prevention, treatm ent and m anagem ent of the social and econom ic costs of the disease rem ains the prim ary and m ost critical avenue for confronting the disease. Given the fact that all of the countries with high and/or rapidly rising rates of HIV infection (as well as its sister illnesses , m alaria and tuberculosis) are developing or transition econom ies, any scenario that entertains the prospect of intervention on a scale sufficient to stop the disease in its tracks and m itigate the potential negative effects m entioned above m ust contem plate the transfer of significant new resources to a m ajority of these countries. 
FEARS RELATED TO AID INFLO W S
At face value, the story of increased resource inflows for developing countries would appear to be nothing but good news. The additional resources can be used to:
• Provide badly needed resources for the treatm ent and prevention of HIV/AIDS (as well as other diseases) and for addressing som e of the social consequences of the disease, such as the care of AIDS orphans and the repair and support of challenged or com prom ised com m unity institutions and household structures;
• Provide for the rapid replacem ent of hum an resources lost to the infection and the training of additional personnel to address the urgent issues of prevention, treatm ent and m itigation;
• Make progress towards the achievem ent of other MDGs; and
• Provide relief from savings and foreign exchange constraints -thus allowing for m ore optim al (and ultim ately m ore growth-enhancing) decision m aking with respect to production and investm ent-related choices.
Yet, am ong neither developing-country policy m akers nor developm ent specialists is that news received with unanim ous approbation. Such reservations are not without m erit: large aid receipts and, especially, aid inflows that increase rapidly over relatively short periods of tim e com e with several dangers.
AID DEPENDENCY
Large aid flows that persist over extended periods can induce responses that are inim ical to econom ic growth and welfare over the long run. One of those potential negative responses is a reduced dom estic savings rate as dom estic econom ic agents choose to consum e the m ost part of current incom e, with the expectation that foreign savings, in the form of developm ent assistance, will provide the necessary additional resources for investm ent. Related to this is the prospect that the taxation effort m ay dim inish while spending becom es less focused. This would thus com prom ise the potential growth-enhancing effects of public sector activity (Bevan, 2005) . The aid windfall can also induce rent-seeking behavior that detracts from productive activity, negative institutional arrangem ents (focused on the distribution of aid rather than production) that persist long after the high-developm ent-assistance period, and high im port-dependent patterns of production and consum ption that com pel painful adjustm ent beyond that period (Tornell and Lane, 1999; Bevan, 2005) .
In order to escape the effects of dependency, countries facing the prospect of increased aid flows will need to plan and execute the m anagem ent of these flows in ways that reduce the dangers of dependency. This m eans a balance between increased consum ption and increased investm ent and continued efforts to im prove dom estic resource m obilization. U nderstanding and m anaging the political econom y of aid flows will also be critical to avoiding institutional developm ents that com prom ise hum an developm ent and growth. Additionally, countries will need to develop an exit strategy from aid flows to m inim ize the welfare and other costs of a disorderly descent from the period of high developm ent assistance.
U NSU STAINABLE DEBT BU RDENS
Despite the fact that the non-grant elem ent of m ost of the official financial assistance received by m any high-prevalence countries com es in the form of concessional finance, the very lim ited capacity of m any of these countries to handle even m oderate debt service burdens m eans that, if a significant proportion of developm ent assistance is provided in the form of loans rather than grants, a relatively rapid build-up to unsustainable debt burdens is a real possibility for several countries (Serieux, 2001 ).
That danger derives from the particular challenge of m eeting external debt repaym ent com m itm ents in the face of lim ited levels of institutional and econom ic developm ent. Servicing external debt requires countries to sim ultaneously overcom e both the internal transfer problem (translating part of the econom ic gains from debt flows into the additional governm ent revenues sufficient for debt repaym ent) and the external transfer problem (translating debt service paym ents denom inated in dom estic currency into debt service paym ents denom inated in foreign currency without com prom ising foreign currency availability for needed im ports). Yet, the econom ic and institutional structures of m any low incom e countries, and all least-developed countries, m ake this challenge particularly daunting. Prim ary com m odity exporters with high export concentrations (a typical profile for m oderate and high HIV/AIDS prevalence countries) face highly volatile export incom e stream s that constrain their ability to m aintain significant and consistent levels of debt service paym ents. Agricultural com m odity producers who m ust contend with the vagaries of nature, in addition to price volatility in international com m odity m arkets, are particularly vulnerable.
Countries with weaker institutional and physical infrastructure have m ore lim ited ability to m obilize dom estic resources and also recover less quickly from econom ic calam ities. All of these factors reduce countries' ability to consistently overcom e the transfer problem s over extended periods, even when faced with m oderate levels of debt service paym ents. Lastly, sm all countries, which generally need to borrow proportionally m ore because of lim ited dom estic econom ies of scale (from dom estic spending), are particularly disadvantaged because debt service paym ents will also tend to be higher relative to both revenues and exports while their likelihood of export concentration is higher.
Notwithstanding HIPC debt relief, m any of the high aid-receiving countries were already showing signs of approaching debt distress by (IMF, 2005a . The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MRDI) m ay serve to further delay the arrival of that threshold for som e countries, but not indefinitely. 6 It will be im portant that donors and recipient countries alike ensure that the loan content of developm ent assistance is consistent with recipient countries' debt carrying capacities -which, it can be argued, m ay be close to nil for som e of the least developed countries.
THE DU TCH DISEASE EFFECT
Dutch disease generally refers to the im m iserizing effect of a foreign exchange-related econom ic windfall on the traded goods sectors of sm all open econom ies. The original m odel, as presented by Corden and Neary (1982) , referred to the effect of a natural resource discovery but, since vanWijnbergen's (1986) observation that it could be equally applicable to recipients of large aid inflows, the threat of Dutch disease has been an outstanding concern for aid recipients despite little clear evidence of its presence to this point (an issue to which we will return in Section VI).
Like a natural resource windfall, a high-aid recipient country receives large inflows of foreign currency. A significant part of that aid is spent on nontradable goods, raising their prices (determ ined dom estically) relative to tradable goods prices determ ined (for sm all open econom ies) on the world m arket. 7 The result is a real exchange rate appreciation. That appreciation will be dem onstrated m ostly through a nom inal appreciation in the case of a flexible exchange rate regim e or a rise in dom estic inflation in the case of a fixed exchange rate regim e. The real appreciation reduces the com petitiveness of the dom estic traded goods sectors. Over the long run, production in these sectors contract and resources shift to the production of nontradables. The result is a less diversified and m ore vulnerable econom y that is increasingly dependent on external resource flows. Thus, the short-run welfare benefits of the aid inflows m ay be superseded by the welfare losses from the increased cost of non-traded goods and the loss of production in the traded goods sector.
Aid-related Dutch disease m ay portend even higher costs than resource-related Dutch disease. In the case of natural resources, the benefit typically lasts several decades; but aid flows are unlikely to last for such extended periods. Thus, the inevitable reduction in aid flows, the requisite econom ic downturn and the painful process of the reconstruction of the econom y m ay arrive m uch sooner. We investigate the theoretical m odel, several variations on the basic m odel and the em pirical evidence for and against Dutch disease in Section VI and the related exchange rate m anagem ent issues in Section VII.
VOLATILITY OF AID FLOWS
While Dutch disease (aided, no doubt, by the suggestion of an ailm ent in the nam e) is widely seen as the potential curse of high levels of developm ent assistance, the volatility of aid flows, which increases with the size of aid flows (Buliř and Ham ann, 2003) , is perhaps closer to realizing the attributes of a curse.
Aid flows are volatile for several reasons (and in several ways). In the first instance, the inform ation content of aid com m itm ents (the quantity generally used in recipient countries' budgeting), with respect to actual disbursem ents, is poor. As Table 4 indicates, developm ent assistance com m itm ents are poor predictors of disbursem ents. For a group of ten of the highest aid recipient (for the 1970-2005 period), com m itm ents were, on average, significantly larger than disbursem ents and, m ore im portantly, that difference was not very predictable (as indicated by the generally large coefficients of variation for that difference). 8 Secondly, even aid disbursem ents them selves are m ore volatile than fiscal revenues. For eight of the ten countries exam ined in Table 4 , disbursed aid was significantly m ore volatile than revenues (volatility ratios greater than one) and the volatility ratio was generally higher in the 1990s than it was for the overall period exam ined . Thirdly, aid is generally procyclical relative to revenue -m eaning that it tends to exacerbate the variability in revenue stream s. This is confirm ed (for this group of countries) by the uniform ly positive correlation coefficient between aid and revenue in Table 4 . Moreover, these results are not unique to this group of countries but reflect the overwhelm ing conclusion of the em pirical literature (see, for exam ple, Buliř and Ham ann, 2003; and Arellano et al, 2005) .
What these volatility results im ply is that, in and of itself, a sharp unanticipated change in the am ount of aid received by a country that is credit rationed in international capital m arkets (the case for m ost high-aid recipients) is, effectively, an exogenous shock that im poses adjustm ent costs on the econom y. As indicated by Pallage and Robe (2001) , the welfare costs of the business cycles created by these shocks are particularly high in low-incom e countries. Further, when the pro-cyclicality of aid is added to its own cycle-inducing effects, that cost is further m agnified. In cases where a cash budget is used to m anage public sector spending, the stop-start-stop effect induced by the volatility of aid further com prom ises the effectiveness of public sector activity, with concom itant welfare and growth costs (Buliř and Ham ann, 2003) . In short, high aid-receiving countries face the very real prospect of greater volatility in fiscal outcom es and econom ic activity and reduced public sector effectiveness. We exam ine the im plication of exchange rate volatility for exchange rate m anagem ent in Section VI. 
TH E MACRO EC O NO MIC PO LICY C O NTEX T O F INCREASING AID FLO W S
The behavior of countries, with respect to increased aid flows, has to be considered in the context of the m acroeconom ic policy fram ework within which decisions are m ade. For the m ajority of these countries, such a fram ework is sketched out by the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which, in turn, m ust rem ain within the guidelines established by the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF). In fact, m any of these countries have ongoing PRGF arrangem ents with the IMF. These guidelines lead to particular policy preferences that, as we suggest later, m ay hinder countries' ability to optim ally m anage large resource inflows.
SINGLE-DIGIT INFLATION TARGETS
PRGF program m ing usually requires countries to m aintain single-digit inflation. The argum ent for this recom m endation (often im posed de jure by conditionality) is that inflation rates above single digits are very likely to be detrim ental to growth (IMF 2005a (IMF , 2005c . This assuredness in policy prescription persists despite an adm ission that "consensus is lacking on the appropriate inflation range for low-incom e countries" (IMF, 2005a) . The em pirical support for this recom m endation rests on an interpretation of a series of studies that supposedly locate the 'kink' in the inflation-growth relationship -the point at which inflation switches from a positive or neutral to a negative relationship with growth -within the 5-10 percentage range. However, not only do estim ates of the "kink" vary widely (from 3 to 40 percent), but also none of the referenced studies differentiated countries by level of institutional developm ent, econom ic structure or incom e level.
While this is acknowledged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005a) , with its further adm ission that "identifying the growth effect of m oving from inflation rates of 20 percent to 10 percent has been challenging", it nevertheless persists in its choice of a single digit inflation target for PRGF countries. In fact, one study which was not quoted (Sepehri and Moshiri, 2004) , but which did differentiate countries by incom e group, located the 'kink' som ewhere between 11 and 15 percent for low-incom e countries, 15-21 percent for lowerm iddle incom e countries and 4-5 percent for upper-m iddle incom e countries. 9 Based on this evidence, it would seem that the single-digit-inflation rule is not justified and is rather excessive for all countries except the upper-m iddle incom e countries -paradoxically, a developing country group is unlikely to be subject to the strict conditionality of PRGF program s.
It should also be noted that the widely pronounced justification for the PRGF em phasis on m acroeconom ic stability (of which price stability is a critical com ponent) is the experience of the successful Asian econom ies (particularly the Republic of Korea and Taiwan) in previous decades. However, this approach fails to recognize that m acroeconom ic stability was the result of an evolution rather than an obligatory fram ework (Tae, 1972) . As Figure 4 indicates, in the early 1960s, when Korea's m iracle growth perform ance had just gotten underway, quarterly inflation rates were both high and volatile. The low and stable inflation rates that are being dem anded of countries at m uch lower levels of institutional and econom ic developm ent were not achieved until the 1980s -during the m aturing stages of that extended high growth experience. In effect, low incom e countries, with adm ittedly fragile econom ies and im m ature econom ic institutions, are being asked to achieve som ething that fast growing and 'well m anaged' Korea was not able to achieve until its econom ic institutions had m atured significantly. With respect to countries' ability to exercise discretion in the m anagem ent of aid flows and other econom ic changes, 'low-inflation' conditionality is not a sm all m atter. Excessively low inflation targets com prom ise countries' abilities to accom m odate exogenous shocks (including aid volatility). In developing countries (facing downward nom inal rigidities in prices), the first-round effect of these shocks is best accom m odated by allowing upward price shifts. Inflation targets that fail to accom m odate this first-round effect tend to am plify the overall output effect of these shocks -by essentially forcing output to becom e the transm ission m echanism . This reality is fully acknowledged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005a, c) . Monetary policy that is consistent with such low inflation levels also tends to im ply high interest rates, which have negative im plications for investm ent and longterm growth (IMF, 2005a) .
A BIAS TOWARDS RESERVE ACCU MU LATION
Tight inflation targets, per force, translate into relatively rigid m onetary targets (assum ing, of course, closed capital accounts or im perfect capital m obility). Given a m onetary target, PRGF conditionalities allow the net foreign assets com ponent of the m oney supply (reserves) to exceed projected targets, but one would prefer that the net dom estic asset com ponent of the m oney supply com e in below (rather than above) target (IMF, 2005a) . Im plicitly, the countries are encouraged to err on the side of excessive reserve accum ulation.
The reasoning behind this preference is straightforward. Reserve accum ulation im plies an overall balance of paym ents surplus (and a likely current account surplus or sm all deficit) -which is seen to im ply sustainable external balances. By contrast, reserve depletion indicates an overall balance of paym ents deficit (and, likely, a current account deficit as well) and the potential for external sector disequilibrium . Since achieving sustainable external stability is one of the stated objectives of PRGFs program s, the preference described above favors external sector stability. However, this approach discounts the potential cost of reserve accum ulation.
External stability is signaled by sufficient and long-run stable reserves and not necessarily by reserve accum ulation. In the context of essentially closed capital accounts (as is the case for m ost of these countries), once reserves are sufficient to accom m odate the volatility in trade and capital flows, additional accum ulation can be called into question in cost-benefit term s. Reserve accum ulation is, quit sim ply, the accum ulation of claim s on foreign entities and, when there are urgent and unm et resource needs within the dom estic econom y, additional insurance for the external account is a rather thin reed on which to rest the justification for deferring or denying access to these resources.
A DISTASTE FOR LARGE FISCAL DEFICITS
Typically, a fiscal deficit im plies that the public sector is borrowing to sustain expenditures above revenues. The typical presum ption is that governm ent is engaged in one or m ore of the following:
• crowding out the private sector in the m arket for dom estic credit;
• accum ulating foreign and/or dom estic debt that takes it closer to (and often beyond) m axim um sustainable debt levels; and
• m aking excessive use of the seigniorage or inflation tax.
In the view of the IMF (2005 a, c), the first effect is likely to com prom ise current investm ent and growth and the second and third effects m ay com prom ise long-term growth as well as overall m acroeconom ic stability. For these reasons, PRGF program conditionalities encourage countries to m aintain sm all fiscal deficits or surpluses. U nfortunately, when developm ent assistance com es in the form of budget support (particularly grant support), large fiscal deficits are m erely the m eans through which that assistance is translated into useful dom estic initiatives. However, the perception that large fiscal deficits are to be avoided m ay persist even when they have becom e necessary (IMF, 2005b) . In effect, the aversion to large deficits m ay com prom ise the ability of governm ents to deliver aid through the budget. We shall return to these and other issues related to recent experiences with large developm ent assistance receipts in the next section.
D U TCH D ISEASE: TH E TH EO RY , EV ID ENCE AND MANAGEMENT EX PERIENCE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DU TCH DISEASE
U sing the approach em ployed by Nkusu (2004) , the Dutch disease effect is graphically illustrated within a Salter-Swan fram ework that lim its the econom y to two sectors -a tradables sector (T) and nontradables sector (NT). The short-and long-run effects are outlined in Figures  5A and 5B. Partial equilibrium analysis for the traded goods m arket is illustrated in the upper left-hand quadrant, where the sm all open econom y assum ption im plies a perfectly elastic dem and curve for traded goods (D T ). Partial equilibrium analysis for the nontraded goods m arket is illustrated in the upper right-hand quadrant. The lower right-hand quadrant presents the production possibility frontier (PPF) and com m unity indifference curves that define the econom y's consum ption and production choices. The slope of the term s of trade line (between traded and nontraded goods) represents the real exchange rate. Initial equilibrium is assum ed at point A, where there is a trade balance.
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The short-run effect of an aid inflow is illustrated in Figure 5A by an initial shift in consum ption to point B, which is outside the production possibility frontier. The steeper term s of trade line at B indicates a real exchange rate appreciation caused by a rise in the price of nontradables due to increased dem and (D NT ), with no sim ilar price effect in the tradables sector. A trade deficit also develops (or any existing one widens).
11 Figure 5B indicates the long-run effects. The m ovem ent of labor and other resources from the tradable goods sector to the nontradables sector leads to an increased supply of nontradables and a fall in the dom estic supply of tradables (shown by the flattening of the supply curve and production possibility frontier as a result of increased factor m obility over the m edium to long run). This helps to m oderate, but not elim inate, the initial real exchange rate appreciation. The trade deficit also widens because the currency appreciation induces expenditure switching in favor of tradables (im ports). Long-run production is therefore at A' , which im plies a sm aller tradables sector, and consum ption is at B' , still outside the production possibility frontier.
We can use this basic fram ework to exam ine the effects of several suggested m odifications to the m odel assum ptions. As we will see, these m odifications have the potential of reversing or exaggerating the effects described above. Conditions of Excess Capacity (or U nem ploym ent) Nkusu (2004) postulates the condition of excess capacity (in term s of both capital and labor) in the econom y at the tim e of the increase in aid inflow ( Figure 6 ). It can be argued that this is a m ore typical situation for developing econom ies than the full em ploym ent picture presented in Figures 5A and 5B . 12 In the case of unused capacity, the econom y is not operating on its PPF ( Figure 6 ). In this case, the initial real exchange rate appreciation is likely to be replicated, but the inflow (and the increased dem and and resources it im plies) allows the econom y to shift production to its PPF. The real exchange rate appreciation will be m oderated by a larger output response (than in the basic m odel) as the use of previously unused capacity restrains input cost increases. The net result m ay be an actual increase in the production of both traded and nontraded goods. (However, the point of production on the PPF suggests lower production in the traded goods sector than would have been obtained under conditions of full em ploym ent before the capital inflows -a m ute point if resource underutilization had been persistent).
FIGU RE 6
Large Aid Flow w ith Initial Excess Capacity
At first, it m ay seem that the assum ption of unused capacity (including unem ploym ent) m ay not be appropriate in light of what has been said about the loss of labor from HIV/AIDS infections, but two points need to be kept in m ind in that respect. The first is that even for high prevalence countries, it is unlikely that the constraint that they face will be the availability of unskilled labor. A high level of unem ploym ent and underem ploym ent, before and after the arrival of the HIV/AIDS pandem ic, was, and still rem ains, typical in these countries and there is som e flexibility in substituting for unskilled labor in the m edium to long term .
The m ore likely binding constraint on production would be skilled labor, which is typically a scarce input in these countries. This would be exaggerated by factor specificity (such as farm land that is not easily sold or sm all enterprises that are tied to owners). Secondly, even for skilled labor, a significant part of the problem m ay be m orbidity levels (high illness rates and absenteeism ). The lowered production levels (relative to potential) is m ost usefully considered unused capacity (rather than a binding constraint caused by contracting the production possibility frontier) because m uch of that capacity can be recovered relatively quickly through access to better health care (including, but not lim ited to, anti-retroviral therapies).
An Aid-Induced Productivity Effect in B oth Sectors
Adam and Bevan (2006) propose the case where aid inflows are used for governm ent investm ent in infrastructure that results in (roughly equal) productivity gains in both the tradables and nontradables sectors. This situation is illustrated in Figure 7 where the productivity effect is dem onstrated by a sym m etrical expansion of the PPF. Again, the initial real exchange rate appreciation and the shift in dem and towards nontradable goods in the short run are replicated. However, the increased productivity allows for an output response in the nontradables sector that m oderates, and at least partly reverses, the real exchange rate appreciation. This effect, together with the productivity increase in the tradables sector, allows for a net expansion of that sector. Thus, both sectors expand and the long-run trade deficit is sm aller than the short-run trade deficit.
FIGU RE 7
Large Aid Flow s w ith a Generalized Productivity Effect
An Aid-Induced Productivity Effect in the Nontradable Goods Sector Adam and Bevan (2004) also exam ine the prospect of an aid-induced productivity increase in the nontradables sector, but no sim ilar increase in the tradables sector. This scenario is not illustrated by a diagram , but its effects can be deduced in a relatively straightforward m anner. In this case, the expansion of the PPF would be skewed towards the nontradable goods sector (with little or no change in the traded goods intercept). Again, the initial real exchange rate appreciation and increasing dem and for nontraded goods are identical to the effects in the initial m odel. However, over the m edium to long run, the productivity and price-induced supply response in the nontradables sector produces a com plete reversal of the relative price effect. Within a relatively short period (three years according to the sim ulation results of the Adam and Bevan (2004) m odel), the exchange rate appreciation is replaced by a net depreciation that induces a net expansion of the tradables sector as well. The recovery and expansion of the tradables sector is even m ore pronounced than in the case of a sector-neutral productivity effect.
An Aid-Induced Productivity Effect in the Tradable Goods Sector
The situation in which aid-induced public investm ent results in a productivity increase in the tradables sector, with no sim ilar productivity effect in the nontradables sector, is also explored by Adam and Bevan (2004) . This scenario is not illustrated by a diagram but the effects can be readily outlined. The expansion of the PPF, in this case, would be skewed towards the tradable goods sector on the vertical axis (the opposite of that illustrated in the next figure, Figure 8 ). The short-run experience of an initial real exchange rate appreciation and increasing dem and for nontraded goods is yet again reproduced. Over the m edium to long run, the absence of a productivity response in the nontradables sector m eans that the real exchange rate rem ains appreciated, even over the long run. However, the productivity effect in the tradables sector allows it to regain com petitiveness, despite the appreciated exchange rate. Over the long run that sector not only recovers but also expands beyond its initial size.
The Presence of Learning-by-D oing Externalities in the Tradable Goods Sector
The possible effects of aid on tradables, when a (sym m etric) learning-by-doing externality exists in that sector, has been explored by vanWijnbergen (1986) and several others. In our static equilibrium fram ework, this can be best represented by a contraction in the PPF (down the vertical axis) as an outcom e of the initial shift in production away from the tradables sector ( Figure 8 ). In this case, the initial exchange rate appreciation results in a shift in production in favor of nontradables. The presence of a learning-by-doing externality m eans that the fall in production leads to a productivity loss (hence the contraction of the PPF), thus m aking the sector even less com petitive. The net effect is an exaggerated im m iserization of that sector over the long run. In this case, the Dutch disease effect is both exaggerated and accelerated. The long-run trade deficit is also larger than it is in the standard fram ework.
FIGU RE 8
Large Aid Flow s w ith Learning-by-doing Externalities
O fficial D evelopm ent Assistance for H IV /AID S and Supply Effects
Based on the above analysis, one can identify three attributes of high HIV/AIDS prevalence countries that would induce short or long-run supply effects sufficient to elim inate or significantly reduce the likelihood of Dutch disease effects.
i. Virtually all of the econom ies with significant levels of HIV/AIDS prevalence start with som e level of unused capacity that can be utilized, through the appropriate use of aid resources, to induce a short-run supply response to increased dem and in the nontraded goods sector, with very little associated price or wage effect.
ii. HIV/AIDS already appears to be constraining growth in high prevalence countries. As has already been m entioned, this is likely to be occurring, not from shortages of labor per se, but from skilled labor constraints, m orbidity and lim ited factor m obility. Interventions (such as expanded access to antiretroviral therapies) that can im m ediately increase the availability and productivity of existing labor and hum an capital will have an im m ediate supply effect in both the nontraded and traded goods sector. This will further dam pen both the relative price shift and the input price effects that are part of the Dutch disease story.
iii. Aid directed at m itigating HIV/AIDS effects, as well as other MDG-related initiatives, enhance hum an as well as institutional developm ent. Both of these factors have real productivity im plications for both the tradable and nontradable goods sectors. Further, if, as has been suggested, growth rates have been slowed by the HIV/AIDS pandem ic (despite rem aining positive), even restoration of growth to its potential level constitutes a net productivity gain. As indicated above, the presence of such a productivity effect virtually elim inates the potential for Dutch disease over the m edium to long run.
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR A DU TCH DISEASE EFFECT OF AID
Given the fact that the possible link between aid and Dutch disease has received a significant am ount of attention in the theoretical literature, the em pirical literature on the relationship between aid and Dutch disease is rem arkably sparse. One possible reason for this shortcom ing m ay be the fact that the Dutch disease effect of aid is seen as one of m any potential negative effects of aid on growth. Thus, the broader question (nam ely, whether aid has a positive effect on growth, which, from the perspective of m any observers, is the m ore im portant one) has dom inated the em pirical literature. However, a Dutch disease effect m ay not necessarily im ply poor growth perform ance (particularly in the short run) and a good growth perform ance under an aid regim e m ay not necessarily im ply the absence of Dutch disease effects.
In perhaps the earliest m ulticountry study of the aid-Dutch disease link, Elbadwi (1999) exam ined the relationship between aid, real exchange rates and non-traditional exports for a sam ple of sixty-two countries. He found that a 35 percent increase in aid levels was associated with a real exchange rate appreciation of three percent. However, exchange rate overvaluation was associated with an increase in non-traditional exports, rather than the contraction predicted by the Dutch disease m odel. This also im plied a positive relationship between aid and non-traditional exports. However, that relationship was found to be nonlinear. The initial positive relationship eventually becom es negative as aid increasesexhibiting a Laffer curve effect. The im plication is that aid has a positive effect on the production of tradable goods, but that effect eventually evaporates at very high levels of aid and a Dutch disease type effect takes over. Sekkat and Varoudakis (2000) exam ined one aspect of the Dutch disease story for 33 sub-Saharan African countries -i.e., the relationship between exchange rate overvaluation and m anufacturing exports. They found a negative relationship between exchange rate overvaluation and m anufacturing exports. However, in the absence of a corresponding link between aid and overvaluation, this does not rise up to a verification of the Dutch disease story. Rajan and Subram anian (2005) take both the direct and indirect paths in investigating the em pirical evidence for aid-related Dutch disease. They exam ined the relationship between the level of aid receipts (relative to incom e) and the perform ance of exporting sectors versus sectors producing non-exportables. They found that, in high aid-receiving countries, the exportable-producing (tradable) sectors grew significantly m ore slowly than the sectors producing non-exportables (nontradables). The authors argue that the Dutch disease explanation for that effect is confirm ed by the finding of a positive relationship between aid and exchange rate overvaluation and between the retarded growth of export-producing sectors (relative to non-export-producing sectors) in the face of exchange rate overvaluations. However, in light of earlier analysis, this is not sufficient to confirm Dutch disease effects. The observed effects (aid increase, exchange rate appreciation and lower relative growth of tradables sectors) are also consistent with the condition where there is, initially, an underutilization of capacity ( Figure 6 ). Verification of Dutch disease would have to be dem onstrated either by an actual contraction of the export-producing sectors or sustained and substantially slower growth sufficient to produce a considerable im balance in the econom y over the long run.
While the m ulticountry em pirical studies seem to be weakly supportive of the aid-related Dutch disease proposition, the exam ination of single-country experiences produces quite a different picture. More particularly, Nioni (1998) found that for Tanzania, high aid levels (relative to GDP) were associated with a depreciating real exchange rate, accelerated export growth and a positive growth record. Nkusu (2004) indicates that Botswana experienced a depreciating exchange rate and a stellar growth rate during the period when it ostensibly received a windfall from its rapidly expanding (diam ond) m ining industry. Though Botswana would appear to have been a classic case study for the typical (resource-related) Dutch disease effect, it should be pointed out that between 1960 and 1980, the very period when m ining operations were expanding, Botswana received, yearly, aid equivalent to an average of fifteen percent of its GDP. Thus, Botswana would appear to be a test case for the com bined Dutch disease effects, but none appears to be present. As Nkusu (2004) points out, the possible countervailing effects of expansion of unused capacity and productivity m ust be considered in this case. A sim ilar story m ay have been at work in Tanzania.
MANAGING AID SU RGES: SOME COU NTRY EXPERIENCES
As was m entioned earlier, despite the absence of com pelling evidence of Dutch disease, 13 the fear of Dutch disease has been a m ajor concern for policym akers and researchers alike when countries m ove from low to high or m edium aid receipts. The desire to avoid currency appreciation often seem s to override the need to ensure that aid is used effectively for its intended purpose. Such an approach is described in Younger (1992) , who exam ines the increase in aid receipts in Ghana (from very low to m oderate levels) in the latter half of the 1980s. According to Younger (1992) , with respect to external sector policies, the Ghanaian governm ents engaged in sustained devaluations of the (fixed) nom inal exchange rates and accum ulated reserves. Dom estic sector policy consisted of expanded governm ent deficits to accom m odate the increase in aid com bined with strict m onetary policy in an attem pt to sterilize the effect of accum ulating reserves. The result was a slight depreciation, rather than appreciation, of the real effective exchange rate. Ostensibly, Ghana had avoided any Dutch disease effects. The cost, however, was both high inflation and high interest rates.
While Younger (1992) did not find fault with this approach, he did propose that governm ent should shift its division of spending of aid inflows from 80 percent direct spending and 20 percent transferred to the private sector (via debt repurchases and bank deposits) to, roughly, 40 percent spending and 60 percent transfer to the private sector. As IMF (2005b) points out, this approach would am ount to com pounding a refusal to use the aid to access international goods and services (absorption) with a refusal to spend it for the intended objectives (via increased governm ent spending on public projects or program s). This would essentially be a repudiation of the assistance.
Atingi-Ego (2005) recounts a sim ilar experience for U ganda for the period 1998 to 2000. During that period, official developm ent assistance to U ganda, m ostly in the form of budget support, essentially doubled. Here, again, a m ajor preoccupation was avoiding an exchange rate appreciation. The result was continuous reserve accum ulation to prevent an appreciation of the nom inal exchange rate and sale of governm ent treasury bills to sterilize the effect of reserve accum ulation on the m oney supply (and thus m eet low inflation targets). The real effective exchange rate, in fact, depreciated through m ost of that period but, predictably, the result was high real and nom inal interest rates. Besides the predictable dom estic effect of these high interest rates, U ganda had to cope with a significant net private capital inflow in 2003 as the high dom estic interest rates (and an only slowly depreciating currency) led to foreign purchases of U gandan Treasury Bills. This, of course, only m ade m atters worse and suggests that this approach to handling aid inflows can be self-defeating if the capital account is even partially open.
The U gandan experience is one of five sim ilar episodes reviewed by IMF (2005b) for the sam e period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . This paper argues, quite convincingly, that the optim al approach to aid (in the form of budgetary support) is to allow a current account deficit equal to the size of the aid inflow, and to increase governm ent expenditure by an am ount equal to the dom estic value of aid inflows. Such an approach should, initially, result in (and, in fact, require) a real appreciation of the currency and additional relative prices shift (that m ay im ply higher inflation). Neither of these effects is expected to be large since both effects will be m oderated by the use of foreign exchange to purchase im ports and by supply responses in the nontraded goods sectors. Yet, none of the five countries exam ined (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozam bique, Tanzania and U ganda) quite achieved that ideal and only Mozam bique actually tried. Ghana directed all of the aid-related foreign exchange into reserve accum ulation and spent very little of it through the governm ent budget; 14 Ethiopia directed m ost of the aid into reserve accum ulation and spent none of it via the governm ent budget; Tanzania directed all of the aid to reserve accum ulation, but spent m ost of its dom estic equivalent via the governm ent budget; U ganda (as noted earlier) directed m ost of the foreign exchange to reserve accum ulation but spent m ost of the dom estic equivalent through the governm ent budget; and Mozam bique directed only one third of the foreign exchange to reserve accum ulation and spent all of the dom estic equivalent through the governm ent budget (IMF, 2005b) .
The failure to m ake m axim um use of aid appeared to have com e largely from fears about real appreciations, inflation, and large fiscal and current account deficits. The fear of real exchange rate appreciation was the dom inant factor behind the accum ulation of reserves, 15 but the resulting increase in the m oney supply was consistently sterilized to ensure low inflation levels while governm ent spending was kept down (though, clearly, not as aggressively as the current account deficit) (IMF, 2005b) . The resistance to expanded budget deficits was m otivated, in part, by fears about inflation but was also m otivated by what appeared to be general aversions to large fiscal deficits despite the clear justification for fiscal expansion by the budget support itself (IMF, 2005b) . In general, the predom inant concerns were assuaged -real exchange rates depreciated or stayed constant, inflation was kept down and governm ent budget deficits were m oderate or sm all -but this was at the cost of very high real dom estic interest rates and, m ost tellingly, a general failure to fully utilize aid for its intended purpose (or, in the case of Ghana and Ethiopia, to use it at all).
AID VOLATILITY -THE BACKGROU ND NU ISANCE
While m uch of the concern about the effect of rapid increases or high levels of aid inflows has been the potential Dutch disease effect, an ever present, but less central, feature has been the volatility of aid. Aid, as noted earlier, becom es m ore volatile as it increases and that volatility can pose m ajor concerns and challenges for recipient countries. Atingi-Ego (2005) noted, in passing, that the increased budget support had m eant less predictable budget outcom es with related econom ic disruptions. For the five countries exam ined, IMF (2005b) confirm ed all of the volatility-related problem s identified by Buliř and Ham ann (2003) . Aid levels were hard to predict from one year to the next and when two of the countries (Ethiopia and U ganda) experienced exogenous (term s of trade) shocks, the donor response (in term s of sharp increases in aid receipts) was fully one year after the peak of the crisis. While lim ited flexibility in term s of budgetary spending outcom es, due to PRGF conditionality, m eant that aid volatility did not necessarily translate into expenditure volatility, the form er was still transm itted into the econom y via changes in the dom estic funding of budget deficits. The transm ission m echanism s were greater interest rate volatility and increased variability in available credit to the private sector (from the alternative tightening and relaxation of bank credit rationing).
MANAGING AID INFLO W S: CO NSID ERATIO NS AND PRO PO SALS
THE MANAGEMENT OF AID INFLOWS: AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
The m anagem ent of exchange rate inflows can be thought of as the transfer problem in reverse -with the additional requirem ent that aid is used for its originally intended purpose. This broader challenge can thus be subdivided into three sub-challenges that are, nevertheless, closely interlinked (as will be indicated subsequently).
i. Macro-absorption -the degree to which aid is absorbed into (or transm itted to) the broader m acroeconom y. It essentially boils down to the division of aid between reserves and the current account deficit (assum ing a current account balance before aid). Full m acro-absorption m eans that none of the aid is used to accum ulate reserves (except in the very short term ) while the use of aid to accum ulate reserves m eans, essentially, no m acro-absorption.
ii. Spending -the am ount that is im m ediately transm itted through the governm ent budget (or through a designated non-governm ent agency) into actual spending in the dom estic econom y. Full spending requires an increase in the fiscal deficit by an am ount equal to the dom estic value of incom ing developm ent assistance, accom plished either by a net increase in expenditures or a fall in tax revenues.
iii. Micro-absorption -the use of aid for its intended purpose and, m ore specifically, its productive use (in term s of welfare and productivity effects or both).
iv. The issues and im plications of different actions related to these challenges are articulated in greater detail below.
Macro-absorption
For the receiving country, a disbursem ent of aid am ounts to an entitlem ent to foreign goods, services or assets. If we assum e a closed capital account (which is the case for m ost large aid recipients), once aid is received, it can either be used to im port the additional goods and services to which the country has becom e entitled (thereby increasing the current account deficit), or the entitlem ent can be 'saved' for future periods by increasing foreign exchange reserves.
If the country chooses to increase im ports, the m ost im m ediately relevant issues are the related exchange rate effects, sustainability and the content of im ports. In a flexible exchange rate regim e, in order to induce the increased dem and for im ports, the foreign currency equivalent of the entitlem ent m ust be sold, thus pushing down the price of foreign currencya nom inal exchange rate appreciation (and real appreciation, or slowdown in depreciation, if inflation rem ains unchanged). If the exchange rate is fixed, the sam e result is accom plished by induced inflation from the equivalent increase in the m oney supply (when aid is initially added to reserves and spent or deposited outside the central bank). 16 This real exchange rate appreciation is, of course, what raises concern about the possibility of Dutch disease. The larger current account deficit does not im ply an external sector im balance since it is funded by an autonom ous capital inflow; however, countries m ay be legitim ately concerned about the sustainability of that deficit.
Radical changes in aid disbursem ents from one year to the next im ply rapid expansion and contraction of current account deficits, not unlike term s of trade shocks. This volatility is likely to translate into exaggerated variability in output and investm ent in the general econom y, unless countries have sufficient reserves to m aintain foreign exchange availability, and thus sm ooth im ports. This is typically not true of low incom e countries in general and aiddependent econom ies in particular. The content of im ports is also im portant because it indicates the nature of consum ption and the potential for aid dependency. Im ports of capital goods and non-luxury goods (such as anti-retroviral drugs in the case of HIV/AIDS-related assistance) are an indication that aid is being used for increasing production and/or directly im proving welfare. The use of substantial am ounts of aid-related foreign exchange to purchase luxury item s (or previously locally-produced goods) m ay be an indication of aid dependency (or Dutch disease effects).
If the recipient country chooses to increase reserve accum ulation, this can be thought of as tem porary banking of the entitlem ent. As noted earlier, this can be used to sm ooth im ports (or keep them in line with dem and and/or spending). However, reserve accum ulation also m eans an addition to the m oney supply that, ceteris paribus, is inflationary. In the absence of an increase in m oney dem and, the m onetary authorities m ay find it necessary to sterilize that addition to the m oney supply by selling securities on the open m arket, increasing required reserve ratios or reducing com m ercial banks' holdings of governm ent deposits.
Spending
If we m ake the (not wholly unrealistic) assum ption that all of the aid is transferred through the public sector (as budget support or public projects), then the degree to which the aid is transm itted to its intended target (without sacrificing other initiatives) depends on how m uch of that aid the governm ent chooses to spend and what it chooses to do with the aid that it does not spend. 17 If all of the aid is spent directly, there will be a requisite increase in the governm ent budget deficit (relative to pre-aid levels). 18 As with the case of the balance of paym ents deficit, sustainability is also an issue. Sharp m ovem ents in aid flows also im ply sharp m ovem ents in the governm ent deficit, which can be destabilizing not only for the econom y but for governm ent operations as well.
If the governm ent chooses not to spend all of the aid (by increasing the budget deficit by less than the am ount of the aid), it has the choice of transferring som e of that aid to the private sector (or at least the benefits of that aid) or 'saving'" it with the central bank. The transfer to the private sector is achieved via a reduction in net dom estic borrowing from the private sector (which includes the retirem ent of debt, increase in net lending or an increase in governm ent deposits outside the central bank as possibilities). This would am ount, essentially, to governm ent 'crowding in' of the private sector. In the right policy and institutional environm ent, this can m ean lower interest rates and higher investm ent rates, but it also im plies an explicit choice of private spending priorities over public sector spending priorities. Justifying such a choice in the face of high Aids prevalence rates and underdeveloped health sectors is likely to be a tall order.
If the governm ent chooses to spend less than the aid received by increasing its deposits at the central bank (with an equivalent retention of reserves), this am ounts to setting aside aid for later use. (This m ay m ean that not all aid-related initiatives are im plem ented, that they are im plem ented but only partially funded, or that the net increase in spending is less than the increase in aid because other spending initiatives are cut back). The aid thus set aside obviously has no im m ediate im pact (on either inflation or exchange rates) because it is neither m acro-absorbed nor spent. This strategy (of delaying the use of aid funds) can be used to m anage the im plem entation process by sm oothing the spending of aid. However, whether donors would be willing to allow such flexibility in the tim ing of aid spending is another m atter.
Micro-absorption
As suggested by Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006) , m icro-absorption relates to two aspects of the im plem entation of aid-financed initiatives.
a) The degree to which aid reaches its intended target (or at least where it is spent and how it was intended); and b) The rate of return acquired per dollar of aid. That rate of return can be m easured in term s of welfare im pact, growth im pact or any m easure related to the project objectives.
Achieving the first objective has to do with ensuring that the resources do indeed flow to the required institutions and individuals, and adequate structures and procedures have been put in place to m aintain and m anage the transfer of resources. In the case of HIV/AIDS-related aid, this will be necessary to ensure that resources are directed in the right am ounts, and to the right institutions, for the appropriate interventions (e.g., prevention, care, treatm ent and hum an capital developm ent). It is, nevertheless, distinctly possible that aid is properly directed and transferred, but a poor rate of return is achieved.
The rate of return is articulated through two m easures -the average rate of return and the m arginal rate of return (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006) . The average rate of return speaks to the existence of the appropriate preconditions for aid. If the arrival is preceded by the developm ent of appropriate infrastructure, institutions and hum an capital and/or it releases a binding constraint on econom ic or social activity, the effectiveness (whether m easured in econom ic or welfare term s) is likely to be high.
The m arginal return to aid (the conventional concept of aid absorption) refers to the return to each additional dollar of aid (given existing physical and institutional infrastructure). This will, of course, be a decreasing function of aid, but the rate at which it decreases will depend on capacity and flexibility within both the im m ediate institutional setting and the broader m acroeconom y. Clearly, these outcom es are closely related to 1) spending decisions because the proper planning, m anagem ent and channeling of aid flows can have a significant im pact on both productivity m easures (Walters, 2006) ; and 2) the degree of m acro-absorption because ready access to im ported goods (or foreign services such as training) m ay be a critical com ponent of the effective im plem entation of projects and program s.
AID INFLOWS AND EXCHANGE RATE MANAGEMENT
Targeting Micro-absorption
Official developm ent assistance is m ost effective when its welfare and/or output benefits are m axim ized -m eaning that it is optim ally m icro-absorbed. Therefore, the prim ary objective in the m anagem ent of aid flows m ust be to ensure optim al m icro-absorption. If aid is properly targeted, reaches its intended target and is used to advance the planned objectives, the welfare and econom ic benefits are likely to far outweigh related costs. Thus, the optim al m acro-absorption and spending choices should be those that best serve that ultim ate goal. Exchange rate m anagem ent concerns m ust therefore be sim ilarly m otivated. More precisely, the objectives can be defined as:
i. Ensuring the best environm ent for optim al m icro-absorption; while ii. Lim iting potential negative consequences to the m acro econom y (such as dependency, debt distress, Dutch disease, excessive volatility and m acroeconom ic instability).
Provided that aid is well targeted and disbursed, m icro-absorption is likely to result in the best average and m arginal rates of return over the m edium and long run if the aid directed at expanding capacity (through the construction of necessary infrastructure, institution building and related hum an developm ent) is concentrated at the front end (of increased aid receipts) rather than spread over an extended period. This is because existing capacity (physical, hum an and institutional) always defines the lim its of potential benefits from HIV/AIDS related interventions. The earlier that capacity is enhanced, the greater the recipient country's ability to ensure the largest welfare and productivity effects of aid over the m edium term will be.
However, the process of expanding capacity itself can be subject to rate-of-return challenges. In particular, if aid flows are inconsistent, creating delays and start-stop-start effects, both the quality of resulting infrastructure and hum an capital developm ent and the speed of capacity expansion are likely to be com prom ised. Hence, the flow of aid needs to be either predictable or sequenced in a m anner that allows for m aintaining consistent spending patterns even in the face of inconsistent disbursem ent patterns.
These im peratives, with respect to optim al m icro-absorption, advocate for significant frontloading of aid for the following reasons: i. Frontloading allows for the im m ediate use of aid for urgent prevention, treatm ent and social interventions to the m axim um of existing capacity.
ii. Over the m edium to long term , the ability to use aid productively will be highly dependent on the capacity to distribute and apply aid effectively for prevention, treatm ent and related objectives (som e of that capacity, such as the stock of m edical personnel, would itself have been dam aged by the disease). If that capacity is not put in place or repaired early on, the m arginal returns to aid, once existing capacity has been used up, will fall sharply. Further, the average rate of return will rise only as capacity is increased. Therefore, im m ediate expansion of capacity for further interventions m ust also be an initial objective of aid flows.
iii. Additionally, if aid is sufficiently frontloaded, there m ay be room for less than full absorption and spending of aid without significantly com prom ising im m ediate objectives. The entitlem ents thus set aside (assum ing a m atch between partial absorption and partial spending) can be used to sm ooth subsequent expenditures on aid-related initiatives -thereby m inim izing the m acro and m icroeconom ic effect of aid volatility.
One caveat to be kept in m ind is that frontloading of aid cannot be an objective in and of itself. Frontloading is optim al if it can, in fact, be used for the objectives outlined above. However, if there are difficulties in using aid itself (such as lim ited early identification of appropriate projects and program s and a record of corrupt or poor accounting practices), it is appropriate that these challenges be am eliorated before aid is increased to peak levels.
Another related concern is targeting and distribution. If aid is not targeted at areas that are likely to provide im m ediate benefits in term s of im proved health (such as antiretroviral therapies, im provem ent of basic health facilities and training of health workers), expanded capacity and the repair of social and institutional infrastructure, it is unlikely that the average and m arginal rates of return will be high. Related to this is the degree of geographic concentration of resource spending. Aid spending that is geographically concentrated (such as in the m ajor hospitals and cities) is m ore likely to have large and unwarranted price and wage effects even if it is spent according to plan. The health-care structures of m ost developing countries suggest that both the greatest need and capacity for rapid im provem ent and expansion are in sm all-and m edium -size healthcare facilities. An allocation of aid expenditure that is cognizant of that fact is m uch less likely to com e up against resource and distribution bottlenecks that underm ine the m arginal returns to aid expenditure. U nderstandably, frontloading will exacerbate fears of Dutch disease effects because it m eans a very rapid scaling up of aid. Indeed, if m ost of that aid is m acro-absorbed (as it should be) and spent (as it should be), an initial real exchange rate appreciation is unavoidable. U nder flexible exchange rate regim es, m ost of the adjustm ent will be in the nom inal exchange rate, but there is likely to be som e upward m ovem ent in dom estic prices as well. U nder a fixed exchange rate regim e, all of the adjustm ent will be in dom estic price changes, im plying a m ore substantial increase in dom estic inflation. While this m ay appear to portend Dutch disease effects, the m ore appropriate interpretation is that this is the ordinary (and correct) working of the price m echanism . The real exchange rate appreciation is necessary to increase the dem and for im ports and (together with som e upward dom estic price adjustm ent) signal the increased dem and for nontradable goods (and thus an inducem ent for a supply increase). Whether this will lead to Dutch disease effects depends on the extent of the initial supply response (in the non-traded goods sector) and the m edium -to long-run evolution of that response.
These effects depend, in turn, on the prevailing econom ic conditions and the effect of increased aid-related spending. As was shown earlier, both the presence of underutilized capacity in m ost developing econom ies and the im m ediate productivity effects derived from HIV/AIDS interventions (such as the use of antiretroviral therapies) suggest short-run supply effects sufficient to dam pen wage and price responses to aid flows, thus underm ining the potential for Dutch disease effects. Over the m edium to long run, the general enhancem ent of hum an developm ent levels and the repair and im provem ent of physical, social and institutional infrastructure should further enhance productivity in both the tradable and nontradable goods sectors -m aking Dutch disease effects even less likely.
A "HIV/AIDS-FOCU SED" APPROACH TO MACROECONOMIC POLICY As described earlier (in Sections V and VI), the approach that appears to have been taken by m ost countries thus far is not conducive to optim izing m icro-absorption. This approach em phasizes the preservation of m acroeconom ic stability (interpreted as low inflation, sm all fiscal and current account deficits and stable real and nom inal exchange rates), which is seen as a necessary prerequisite for econom ic growth. As suggested by Moser and Ichida (2001) , that growth is seen as critical to continued im provem ents (or reversal of declines) in hum an developm ent -particularly in low-incom e countries. By jeopardizing m acroeconom ic stability, large aid inflows would seem to put at risk the very attribute that it is (ultim ately) aim ed at enhancing through HIV/AIDS interventions -hum an developm ent. From such a perspective, frontloading of aid would m ake the prospect of large aid inflows doubly unattractive by increasing the m agnitude of potential m acroeconom ic disruption early on. We shall refer to this approach as the 'stability-focused' approach because, though its proponents do not argue that the protection and expansion of hum an developm ent gains is the ultim ate objective of increased aid flows, it is presum ed that the growth-to-hum an developm ent channel is a critical causal link that m ust be protected by a stable m acroeconom ic environm ent.
Besides the fact that this approach em ploys an overly strict interpretation of m acroeconom ic stability, it is based on a presupposition that is not borne out by the reality of high HIV/AIDS prevalence countries. As indicated in Section II, HIV/AIDS does not sim ply threaten hum an developm ent, it also threatens growth directly (as well as through its effects on hum an developm ent). Therefore, creating the correct environm ent for growth m ay am ount (m etaphorically speaking) to protecting the front of the store while the thieves m ake away with the goods via the backdoor. A stable m acroeconom ic environm ent cannot m itigate the effects of HIV/AIDS on growth. If the pandem ic rem ains unchecked, there is a strong likelihood that it will eventually reconfigure the hum an developm ent-growth relationship from a virtuous cycle to a vicious one -as com prom ised growth and im proved hum an developm ent feedback into each other (Boozer et al, 2003) .
A m ore appropriate approach, in the context of substantial increases in aid flows related to the HIV/AIDS pandem ic, is one that gives prim acy to addressing the pandem ic and its effects directly -understanding that the protection and/or restoration of both growth and hum an developm ent are desired outcom es of such an approach. Within this fram ework, a stable m acroeconom ic environm ent would be seen as a desired objective w ithin the fram ework of optim al m icro-absorption rather than the preem inent (and com peting) objective of growth-oriented policies. By necessity, this would require a m ore reactive, rather than proactive, approach to the m anagem ent of the m acroeconom y (as we will shortly describe). A proactive approach m eans that m onetary and fiscal policies are aim ed at m eeting and sustaining targets for m ajor m acroeconom ic variables. A reactive approach would allow for m ovem ents in m acroeconom ic variables if they are justified by necessary econom ic adjustm ents and reserve the use of m onetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies for accelerating overly sluggish adjustm ent and correcting large and counterproductive m ovem ents of these variables. This approach will be referred to as the 'HIV/AIDS focused' approach. A critical difference between the two approaches is the centrality (or lack thereof) of m icro-absorption concerns.
The 'HIV/AIDS focused' approach takes as a given that full (or substantial) m acroabsorption and full (or substantial) spending of aid will, and should, result in m acroeconom ic disturbances. In the short-run, given downward nom inal price rigidities, prices will rise, real exchange rates will appreciate, and the fiscal and current account deficit will be larger. All of these changes are expected attributes of an econom y that is m aking the necessary adjustm ents (to the scale-up in aid flows) by sending the correct signals to econom ic agents. If m icro-absorption is successful, price effects will be neither excessive nor long-lived, the real exchange effect will be m oderated (and even possibly reversed) 19 and the fiscal and current account deficits will have no destabilizing effect on the broader econom y.
From the perspective of the 'HIV/AIDS focused' approach, disturbances to the m acroeconom y caused by aid inflows should be a legitim ate cause for concern only if:
i. price and real exchange rate adjustm ents are large and prolonged; and/or ii. fiscal and current account deficits exceed those dictated by the value of aid inflows (given pre-existing preferences for these variables before aid flows).
A substantial and extended inflationary effect would suggest that m icro-absorption has not been successful. This m ay be due to im proper use of aid, institutional or other bottlenecks that are not responsive to price signals or low m arginal rates of return (nam ely, that m icroabsorptive capacity is exceeded). A real appreciation that is not reversed or m oderated over tim e does not necessarily portend Dutch disease if productivity effects in the tradables sector are sufficient to allow that sector to rem ain com petitive (Adam s and Bevan, 2006) . However, if the appreciation is large and not m oderated over the m edium term and if no productivity effect is forthcom ing, there m ay be a case for m ore careful m anagem ent of the exchange rate to retain com petitiveness over the short run.
Fiscal deficits that exceed the value of increased aid inflow directed at budget support and public sector im plem ented projects would be equivalent to a fiscal deficit before aid. If such a deficit is large, the usual im plications with respect to inflationary financing or the crowding out of the private sector in the m arket for dom estic savings apply. Current account deficits (of the balance of paym ents) that exceed the value of aid inflows are also equivalent to such deficits before aid. If the deficit is large, it m ay be unsustainable (i.e., it is not m atched by autonom ous capital inflows and results in the depletion of reserves). It m ay also indicate an excessive reliance on im ports that are sym ptom atic of aid-dependency and/or Dutch disease. If aid-dependency is the problem , than correction will likely require changes in incentives to encourage savings relative to consum ption and the consum ption of dom estic goods relative to im ported goods.
MANAGING DU TCH-DISEASE-TYPE EFFECTS OVER THE MEDIU M TERM
A noted previously, an increase in inflation and a real exchange rate appreciation in the short run are not indicators that Dutch disease is im m inent or likely. However, if these effects are not m oderated in the m edium run (or, in the case of the exchange rate appreciation, counterbalanced by productivity increases in the tradable goods sector), that possibility needs to be taken seriously. In this case, a range of policies can be used to m oderate these effects and m aintain the com petitiveness of a country's exported goods over the m edium term .
Reducing Macro-Absorption and Spending
Regardless of the exchange rate regim e, this policy is likely to be successful because it am ounts, essentially, to m oderating the flow of aid and thus reducing the potential of Dutch disease effects. However, it also m eans an essential repudiation of aid beyond a certain level and thus its potential for effectively addressing HIV/AIDS and other hum an developm ent challenges.
Reducing Macro-Absorption but not Reducing Spending
This m ay be a favored approach for countries with flexible exchange rates since the reduced m acro-absorption (reserve accum ulation) will reduce pressure on the exchange rate, but the spending of aid m eans that (ostensibly) aid is not repudiated. However, as the experiences of several countries dem onstrate, reserve accum ulation together with spending im plies an increase in the m oney supply and thus inflationary pressures (IMF, 2005b) . The typical response has been to sterilize the effect (of reserve accum ulation) by a restrictive m onetary policy -with resulting high interest rates and credit contractions. This approach has been successful where capital m obility is lim ited. However, where capital is significantly m obile, or the interest rate effect is strong, that policy m ay be underm ined by increased private capital inflows that negate the reserve accum ulation altogether and force even m ore restrictive m onetary policy (Atingi-Ego, 2005).
Reducing Spending but Allow ing Micro-Absorption
For countries with fixed exchange rates, the m ajor com ponents of the Dutch disease effects (the real exchange rate appreciation and real wage increase) will operate purely through dom estic price increases. In this context, reducing spending while lim iting reserve accum ulation will ease inflationary pressures (by reducing m oney supply and dem and increases). However, as noted earlier, the failure to spend aid while m acro-absorbing it am ounts to transferring the use of the (foreign) resource entitlem ent im plied by aid to the private sector. In a country facing significant HIV/AIDS and other hum an developm ent challenges that require urgent public sector intervention, it is difficult to envisage a convincing argum ent for this approach.
Nom inal Exchange Rate D evaluations
In countries with fixed or crawling peg exchange rates, devaluations are likely to succeed in m oderating or avoiding a real exchange rate appreciation over the m edium term if inflation levels are not extrem e. However, devaluations m ay need to be frequent and this approach solves only half the problem for the traded goods sector since real wage (and other input price) increases m ay still occur. Moreover, m ultiple devaluations m ay serve to raise and/or entrench inflation expectations.
Increasing Im port Propensities
By increasing the dem and for foreign currency, an increased dem and for im ports will encourage full m acro-absorption. This will ease pressure on both the nom inal exchange rate and inflation (by accom m odating the increased supply of foreign currency and reducing m oney supply expansion) and thus on the real exchange rate and dom estic input costs. This m ay be a useful policy in the early stages of the scale-up in aid levels when the m obility and availability of dom estic resources m ay be lim ited. However, beyond necessary im ports (such as anti-retroviral drugs and m edical equipm ent), an artificial increase in im port preferences m ay sim ply serve to engender aid dependency by increasing the im port content of consum ption and production. 20 All of the approaches noted above, in the right context, m ay succeed in m aintaining the com petitiveness of tradable goods sectors in countries experiencing a scale-up of aid inflows by m oderating price and real exchange rate effects. Indeed, they can legitim ately serve to buy tim e where bottlenecks or sequencing problem s occur in the use of aid. However, none of these approaches are optim al long-term approaches because they serve either to subm it to failures of m icro-absorption or underm ine m icro-absorption itself. In either case, they place artificial lim its on the effectiveness of aid. Moreover, all of these policies fail to m eet the specificity rule -the m ost efficient form of intervention to achieve a given objective is the one that tackles the problem m ost directly.
The fundam ental argum ent being m ade here is that extended or extrem e price and exchange rate effects of aid are the result of a failure to properly m icro-absorb aid. More specifically, in the case of the HIV/AIDS pandem ic (and MDG goals), if resources are properly used to increase necessary interventions as well as the capacity for interventions, the supply responses should, over the m edium run, overwhelm price responses. In effect, the solutions to m aking aid m axim ally effective and avoiding Dutch disease are the sam e.
Reducing m acro-absorption and spending sim ultaneously am ounts to reducing aid flows and thus essentially refusing further attem pts at m icro-absorption. M acro-absorbing aid but not spending it also precludes m icro-absorption but directs the entitlem ent elsewhere. Sim ilarly, nom inal exchange rate devaluations m erely choose to accom m odate the price effects that are indicators of poor m icro-absorption rather than addressing the price effect them selves. Increasing im port propensities essentially attem pts to bypass or m inim ize m icroabsorption and thus lim it the potential for appropriate supply responses. Spending aid with lim ited m acro-absorption (that is then corrected by sterilization with resulting high interest rates) underm ines m icro-absorption by lim iting price responses and the ability of the private sector to respond to aid-induced investm ent and output responses.
If the price and exchange rate effects of aid derive, in fact, from a failure to m icro-absorb, then, as the specificity rule dictates, the problem should be addressed by engaging m icroabsorption issues directly. The failure to m icro-absorb m ay be related to a range of factors (such as distribution of aid, sequencing, resource bottlenecks and institutional weaknesses) but it is only by addressing these factors that m axim al aid effectiveness can be assured over the long term .
DEBT AND VOLATILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Problem s of excessive debt accum ulation are likely to be exacerbated by the frontloading of HIV/AIDS-related assistance though, for concessional debt, it is unlikely to create im m ediate repaym ent problem s. However, the solution to this challenge lies in the nature of disbursed aid. As long as a substantial am ount of aid is given in the form of loans (regardless of conditionality), there is always the very real likelihood that som e of these countries (m ost of which are low-incom e and m any of which are least-developed) will accum ulate long-term unsustainable debt burdens because their debt-carrying capacity is lim ited.
With the increase in aid related to addressing the HIV/AIDS pandem ic, volatility in aid flows (both in term s of discordance between com m itm ents and disbursem ents and year-to-year shifts in disbursem ents) is likely to be substantial and, based on the evidence, it is this attribute of aid that has had the m ost consistently negative econom ic effects (Buliř and Ham ann, 2003; Arellano et al, 2005) . If this volatility is allowed to pass through to project and program spending, it is likely to disrupt both the direct interventions (e.g., prevention and treatm ent) and the capacity building initiatives as project and program spending is disrupted.
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If it is, instead, m atched by changes in the dom estic borrowing com ponent of the fiscal deficit, it will essentially be transferred to the local econom y through interest rate volatility and changes in private credit availability, governm ent would increase its level of borrowing because of the aid shortfall (causing interest rate increases and the rationing of bank credit to the private sector) and governm ent deposits m ay increase with unanticipated disbursem ents (causing interest rates to fall as banks attem pt to reduce excess liquidity via increased lending to the private sector). It is unlikely that both of these m odes of transm ission can be avoided if there is volatility in aid flows; however, active m anagem ent of m acro-absorption and spending can m inim ize the fraction of volatility that is transm itted.
An ideal solution to the problem of aid volatility would be the provision of som ething akin to a line of credit (tied to com m itted aid levels) provided by an institution such as the World Bank or a regional developm ent bank. This would allow countries to exactly m atch shortfalls and excess disbursem ents of aid with withdrawals from and repaym ents to that line of credit. However, this is unlikely to m aterialize given the proclivity of m ost of these institutions to use conditionalities tied to factors other than procedural and accounting issues.
A less efficient option, but one which is available to m ost central banks and fiscal authorities (to the extent that donors are willing to allow the delay of aid spending after disbursem ents), is to m acro-absorb and spend less than 100 percent of aid in the scaling-up phase and use that reserve cushion (and unspent entitlem ent) to m atch disbursem ent shortfalls (while adding to that cushion when disbursem ents exceed planned spending and absorption). However, this will need donors to allow recipient governm ents m ore flexibility in the tim ing of aid spending than is typically allowed, but it is an adjustm ent that recipient governm ents would do well to lobby for.
CO NCLU SIO N
Beyond its im m ediate and personal effects as a chronic and potentially fatal disease, the HIV/AIDS pandem ic has a dem onstrated capacity to com prom ise and even reverse both econom ic growth and hum an developm ent in m oderate and high prevalence countries. The ultim ate consequence is likely to be the failure to m eet Millennium Developm ent Goals generally and poverty reduction objectives specifically. The effects of this disease operate through several avenues. By reducing average life expectancy, increasing child m ortality, and disrupting the developm ent and transfer of social and hum an capital, HIV/AIDS com prom ises hum an developm ent. Increasing rates of m orbidity, loss of hum an capital, reduced investm ent incentives and the crowding out of public investm ent are all likely consequences of m oderate to high HIV/AIDS rates that com prom ise growth. More directly, the poor are m ore vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection and the presence of the disease reduces the likelihood of upward econom ic m obility. For the non-poor, the presence of HIV/AIDS infection within a fam ily increases the likelihood of downward econom ic m obility and thus poverty.
To m itigate these effects, HIV/AIDS infection will need to be arrested, and ultim ately reversed, and the m orbidity and m ortality outcom es of the disease will have to be m itigated by appropriate m edical and social interventions. However, the resources needed for such an outcom e are not within the capacity of m oderate and high-prevalence countries, which are m ostly low incom e and very often least developed. Thus, a substantial increase in the inflow of external resources will be necessary if Millennium Developm ent Goal num bers one (reducing poverty), four (reducing child m ortality) and six (reducing the ravages of HIV/AIDS, m alaria and other m ajor diseases) are to have any chance of being fulfilled. The estim ated resource needs are, understandably, large (U S$55.1 billion for the 2006-2008 period) . External resources are expected to m ake up 70 percent of this estim ated cost (U D$38.5 billion) and, though still well short of that requirem ent, the estim ate of available external resources for the 2006-2008 period is substantial, i.e., U S$27.2 billion. If these resources are to be utilized, high-prevalence countries can expect a considerable increase in ODA inflows over the com ing years.
However, despite the ravages of HIV/AIDS, m any countries view this potential scale-up of aid with som e trepidation. This is, in and of itself, not surprising. Large and sustained inflows do carry potential hazards. These include: aid dependence, unsustainable debt burdens, the disruptive effect of aid volatility and Dutch disease. In the context of a perceived need to m aintain m acroeconom ic stability (in the form of low inflation, stable exchange rates and sm all fiscal and current account deficits) in order to protect econom ic growth, the potential adjustm ent costs of accom m odating large aid inflows are also seen as undesirable.
Thus, the recent response of countries facing large aid inflows has been to restrict m acroabsorption (by accum ulation of reserves instead of m aking foreign currency inflows available for im port expansion) and restricting spending (by keeping fiscal deficits well below what would be dictated by aid disbursem ents). Moreover, these actions are rarely balanced (because spending m ost often exceeds m acro-absorption), leading to the need to sterilize excess m oney supply growth in order to m aintain low inflation (and stable real exchange rates). Beyond the secondary consequences of high dom estic interest rates (from sterilization), the failure to fully m acro-absorb and spend aid (i.e., allowing concom itant increases in current account and fiscal deficits) has m eant that only a fraction (and som etim es only a very sm all fraction) of aid has been m icro-absorbed (m ade available to, and used to fulfill, the intended project or program objective).
Aid dependency and excessive debt accum ulation are well understood potential byproducts of large aid inflows. However, they can be substantially m itigated through appropriate policies -m aintaining dom estic savings rates and ensuring the productive use of aid on the one hand, and a preference for grants over loans as the m eans of resource transfer on the other. The Dutch disease fear, despite its prom inence in the policy literature, does not find strong justification either in the theoretical or em pirical literature. Theoretically, excess capacity in the econom y and/or productivity effects from aid inflows (all very likely outcom es of HIV/AIDS related flows) could be sufficient to negate any potential Dutch disease effects. Em pirically, only weak evidence has been found for Dutch disease effects in m ulti-country studies and there has been virtually no evidence from single country studies. The fear of the (econom ically) disruptive effect of aid volatility rem ains quite valid, however. That effect is overwhelm ingly supported in the em pirical literature and reinforced by recent country experiences.
With respect to policy approaches, this paper argues that the dom inant current approach, which appears to favor m acroeconom ic stability ahead of m icro-absorption, is m isguided. Given that HIV/AIDS affects growth directly (as well as indirectly) in ways that cannot be m itigated by a stable m acroeconom y, m itigating the growth and hum an developm ent effects requires urgent and direct attention to the pandem ic itself. This m eans ensuring, and giving priority to, full and optim al m icro-absorption of aid.
Such an approach im plies ensuring that all aid reaches the intended target, that capacity and institution building are given early and urgent priority -in order to ensure the highest rate of return from each dollar of aid and an ability to use all aid effectively (i.e., with m inim al capacity constraints). This approach would be m ost com patible with (and even dictate) a frontloading of aid and full (or very close to full) m acro-absorption and spending of aid. The single caveat to this prescription com es from the need to protect the m icro-absorption of aid (as well as the broader econom y) from the disruptive effects of volatile aid flows.
Coordinated, less-than-full m acro-absorption and spending (m eaning reserve accum ulation and delayed budget expansion), in order to build up a reserve cover that m ay allow governm ents to sm ooth project and program spending related to HIV/AIDS interventions, is justifiable vis a vis the potential cost of interrupted and unpredictable aid flows. The need for building that reserve (and entitlem ent) cover early in the scale-up phase provides an additional justification for the frontloading of aid. In the current developm ent assistance regim e, donor governm ents and agencies would not look favorably on such action, but recipient governm ents have a valid case for self m anaged aid-sm oothing based on the balance of the evidence.
An approach that prioritizes successful m icro-absorption is not, it is argued here, antagonistic to m acroeconom ic stability. However, it is not com patible with an approach that interprets a stable m acroeconom ic environm ent (in the context of a developing econom y facing a devastating health crisis) as persistent single digit inflation, consistently stable real and nom inal exchange rates and sm all fiscal and current account deficits. Full (or near full) m acro-absorption and spending of aid and vigorous m icro-absorption are all likely to be significantly disruptive to exchange rates and prices in the short-to-m edium term and require significant fiscal and current account deficits. Thus, a m ore useful interpretation of m acroeconom ic stability would be "lim ited and quick correction of unw arranted m ovem ents in critical m acroeconom ic variables." 22 In short, successful and effective m icro-absorption m ust rem ain the central policy objective if the ravages of HIV/AIDS are to be successfully m itigated and reversed.
If the scale-up in aid results in price and exchange rate responses that persist beyond the short run, there are a range of policies that would allow countries to m aintain the com petitiveness of their tradable goods sectors. However, none of these approaches offers a viable alternative to effective m icro-absorption over the long run. In fact, they either am ount to a partial or full abrogation of the responsibility to attem pt full m icro-absorption of aid (the need for which has been clearly identified) or actively underm ine the m icro-absorptive potential. Thus, they im ply less aid or less effective aid and are not legitim ate long-term policy alternatives to the full and effective m icro-absorption of aid.
